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ABSTRACT
The experience of the last thirty years suggests that a wide range of factors affects 
policymakers’ choice of exchange rate regime. The initial explanation was that changes in the 
international sphere dominated domestic policies and strongly influenced how governments 
decided among the trade-offs. More recently, domestic political factors’ influence on the choice 
of exchange rate regimes have been emphasized, providing detailed and rich insights into the 
dynamics of the choice. Neither approach has been entirely successful. Both internal and 
external factors must be taken into account. This article builds on previous empirical work and 
takes into account domestic and international influences on the choice of exchange rate regimes 
in Latin America between 1964 and 1996. In, addition, we highlight a variety of “interactions,” 
choices of economic policy that are affected by both national and international pressures and 
that, in turn, influence the choice of exchange rate regime. The empirical model uses 
multinomial ordered logit analysis to determine the factors in exchange rate determination and to 
compare the explanatory of the models with and without the interaction variables.
The linkages among the international financial system, a country’s exchange rate regime, 
and its domestic real and financial sectors are quite complex and dynamic, challenging our 
simple models and conventional understanding. In addition, the demise of the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates has moved the exchange rate regime to the center of Latin 
American governments’ macroeconomic challenge. The lesson of the 1970's was that fixed 
exchange rates and macro stability could be attained, as long as countries had access to 
ample international capital flows. In the 1980s, policy-makers confronted the disappearance 
of international saving while they attempted to maintain fixed exchange rates, an effort that 
was only sporadically successful. Finally, the 1990s saw a wide variety of exchange rate 
regimes and illustrated that all regimes were consistent with improved macro performance if 
combined with international capital flows. On the other hand, managed exchange rates were 
more subject to destabilizing fluctuations. This led to a short-lived “bi-polar” consensus that 
either a floating or a hard-peg regime was the road to international stability (Fischer 2001). 
Even before Argentina abandoned convertibility in 2002, that conclusion had come into 
question, leaving no simple conclusion to the debate.
The experience of the last thirty years suggests that a wide range of factors affects 
policymakers’ choice of exchange rate regime, though different regimes are associated with 
particular economic performance. The initial explanation was that changes in the international 
sphere dominated domestic policies and strongly influenced how governments decided among 
the trade-offs (Frieden and Rogowski 1996). More recently, domestic political factors’ influence 
on the choice of exchange rate regimes have been emphasized, providing detailed and rich 
insights into the dynamics of the choice (Frieden and Stein 2001; Wise and Roett 2000).
I. Introduction
Neither approach has been entirely successful. The regime choice is so important and 
influenced by such a range of factors that both internal and external factors must be taken into 
account. This article builds on previous empirical work (Frieden, Ghezzi, and Stein 2000) and 
takes into account domestic and international influences on the choice of exchange rate regimes 
in Latin America between 1964 and 1996. In, addition, we highlight a variety of “interactions,” 
choices of economic policy that are affected by both national and international pressures and 
that, in turn, influence the choice of exchange rate regime.
While the study is retrospective of its very nature, the failure to find any one acceptable 
exchange rate regime during the last decade increases its relevance for countries that continue to 
face the problem of finding a viable exchange rate regime. Argentina’s abandonment of 
convertibility, Ecuador’s dollarization, Guatemala’s move in that direction, and Uruguay’s 
forced depreciation all highlight the contemporary centrality of this continuing issue. Thus the 
factors that affect countries’ choices continue to be of central interest today and as we look to the 
coming years.
The next section summarizes the empirical work done to date and develops the 
theoretical basis for the addition of external and interaction variables to the empirical 
investigation. The following section specifies the complete model and presents the estimates 
obtained. The central approach follows closely the earlier empirical work of Frieden, Ghezzi and 
Stein (2001) and draws upon the same data set. We also use the work of Levy and 
Sturzenegger(1999) to assess the sensitivity of such empirical work to definitions of exchange 
rate regimes in Appendix I. The final section summarizes the conclusions obtained by including 
internal, and interaction/external variables in any study attempting to explain the choice of 
exchange rate regime.
II. The Empirical Model of Exchange Rate Regime Choice
Frieden, Ghezzi, and Stein (FGS) developed an empirical model to examine the domestic 
determinants of exchange rate regime choice. Their basic model used multinomial ordered logit 
analysis in order to quantify the effect of the determinant variables on the choice of the exchange 
rate regimes. (See Appendix III for a detailed explanation). The dependent variable, the 
exchange rate regime , had four different response levels:
0- Fixed (to single currency, basket, or infrequent adjustments)
1- Forward-looking crawls and bands
2- Floating (managed or independent)
3- Backward-looking crawl or band.
This was based upon a nine regime classification developed by Cottarelli and Giannini 
(1998) that expanded upon the five regime categories of the IMF. The floating exchange rate 
regime and backward-looking crawl were characterized as more competitive regimes, while 
fixed and forward-looking regimes were adopted to provide stability and credibility. The value 
of 0 for fixed exchange rate regime was used as a base variable against which all others were 
compared. So positive coefficient estimates for the independent variables implied that they 
increased the probability of adopting a more competitive exchange rate regime.
Fixed exchange rate regimes and forward-looking crawls and bands provide stability of 
exchange rates. They also have commonly been adopted as credible anti-inflationary tools by 
countries suffering from high inflation, since exchange rates serve as nominal anchors for the 
price level (Frieden et al., 2000). It follows that both of these regimes will tend to appreciate the 
home country’s exchange rate at the expense of competitiveness. Floating regimes and
backward-looking crawls and bands, on the other hand, allow the home currency to depreciate in 
accordance with the international market forces, because under these regimes the central bank 
does not provide support for a target exchange rate. These are referred to as competitive regimes 
because they are often used to increase the international competitiveness of tradables. Historical 
data on Latin American economies show that fixed and forward-looking regimes have 
consistently produced appreciating real exchange rates, while floating and backward-looking 
regimes are associated with the most depreciated real exchange rates (FGS 2001). It is important 
to understand the properties of different exchange rate regimes to understand the underlying 
decision-making process in choosing a specific exchange rate regime.
There is a great deal of judgment involved in empirical specification of the dependent 
variable, both in choosing the categories and in placing observations into one category rather 
than another. Other authors in the Frieden and Stein (2001) volume made different choices, e.g. 
De Gregorio’s chapter on Chile used five categories of exchange rate regime. Levy and 
Sturzenegger(1999)(LS) developed an empirical technique for determining the regime based on 
cluster analysis and found a very different categorization from that of the IMF, which is based on 
the regime declared by a government. Appendix I compares the FGS categorization with LS’s 
and examines the sensitivity of the results to the different specifications. There were some 
differences in the results with the LS specification, but the general pattern did not alter.
We will follow the FGS judgments on exchange rate regime to facilitate comparison 
between their results with those obtained with a wider set of variables. We should also note that 
FGS carried out sensitivity analysis by reestimating the equations with different definitions of 
the dependent variable and for different periods, in order to provide justification for their 
judgments. The results were found to be robust to alternative specifications.
The FGS model specified a variety of independent variables as exchange rate regime 
determinants, grouped into five categories1:
• macroeconomic/external/structural: lagged log of inflation(Log Inflation); dummy 
variable for hyper inflation (Hyper), which takes the value of 1 if the inflation is 
greater than 1,000%; degree of openness (Open), the ratio of imports plus exports 
as a share of GDP; lagged reserve ratio (Res/M2); coefficient of variation of the 
terms of trade (TOT volatility); and last, capital controls dummy (CapCon), which 
takes the value of 1 if there were restrictions on the capital account.
• Institutional: only one institutional variable was included in the regressions, a 
central bank independence dummy variable (CBI) that took value of 1 if a 
country’s central bank was independent.
• Interest groups: the three major interest group variables were manufacturing’s 
share of the country’s GDP (Manufl), mining’s share of the country’s GDP 
(Minl), and agriculture’s share of the country’s GDP (Agrl). All three were lagged 
one period.
• Political variables: political instability (Polins) took a value of 1 if a country 
experienced three or more government changes in the last five years, two or more 
government changes in the last three years, or if a country had a successful coup, 
in which case the value of 1 is applied to the year in which a coup occurred and 
one year afterwards; the share of government seats in the legislature (Govseats); 
the effective number of parties in the legislature (Effpart); an interaction variable 
(Efpart*Minority) capturing the interaction of the number of parties with a 
dummy variable (Minority) that took a value of 1when the share of government
seats in the legislature was greater than 50%; a dummy variable for dictatorship 
(Dict), which took the value of 1 in a year when a country was under dictatorship.
• Trade liberalization: low tariffs(Tariff), which took the value of 1 if the country’s 
average tariff was lower than 20%; and an interaction dummy variable 
(Manufl*Low Tariff) of low tariffs and the manufacturing share of GDP.
This list of seventeen variables contained only one that was exogenously determined by 
the international system, the volatility of terms of trade. A time trend variable included without 
explanation was also likely to capture the external influence. It was significant in all their 
regressions. It probably captured the international consensus that increasingly favored flexible 
exchange rates, particularly during the 1990s. The importance of this variable suggests that a 
complete examination of the determinants of exchange rate regime should include external 
variables as well as international policy choices whose interaction with domestic policy would 
influence the choice of regime.
There were several such variables in the FGS model. The degree of openness, the 
reserve/M2, and the capital control variables are all policy variables that affect the position of 
the country in the international economy. The same is true of the tariff dummy. Choices in these 
areas are affected by both the international economy and by domestic political choices. Thus we 
term them interaction variables.
Let us now consider why these variables along with additional international 
variables should be included in any effort to develop a more complete empirical model of 
exchange rate determination, drawing primarily on the empirical studies in the Frieden and Stein 
volume.
III. Exchange Rate Regimes: International and Interaction Factors
Many of the individual country studies in the Frieden and Stein volume suggest the 
importance of international and interaction variables in the choice of regime. The history of 
exchange rate regimes in Latin America has not been moved solely by domestic nor by 
international factors. The determinants of the choice are in the combination of the two and their 
interaction, especially during the time period after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 
1973. In addition, with increasing international pressures for liberalization of the Latin American 
economies, external factors have gained more importance as crucial determinants of a country’s 
exchange rate regime. With economic liberalization and increased involvement with the IMF, 
current and capital account balances, as well as their restrictions, terms of trade, and foreign 
liabilities became essential external variables whose macroeconomic importance has increased 
significantly. The country studies included in Frieden and Stein (2001) provide ample support 
for this view.
An example of the importance of the external balance in exchange rate regime 
determination comes from Brazil’s exchange rate regime history (Bonomo and Terra 2001). This 
study of the largest Latin American country’s exchange rate regime history supports the 
importance of the external macroeconomic environment as a crucial exchange rate regime 
determinant. Brazil’s exchange rate policy was guided primarily by balance of payments and 
inflation considerations. Here we see the interaction between an external and an internal factor, 
which supports the proposition that understanding the exchange rate regime requires 
consideration of external, internal, and interaction factors. Brazil is only one among many Latin 
American economies that owe a good part of their dynamic exchange rate regime experiences to 
external economic factors. Argentina’s exchange rate policies have been influenced by such
external factors as: deterioration of the external account, external debt, and liberalization of the 
capital account (Diaz-Bonilla & Schamis, 2001). Unlike Brazil, where the balance of payments 
can be singled out as major influence in exchange rate regime determination, Argentina’s 
exchange rate policy has been influenced by a combination of external factors.
Chile has had a number of exchange rate regime changes in response to external factors. 
In the case of Chile, the external environment, captured by the availability of international funds 
to finance current account deficits, along with the high amount of foreign liabilities were largely 
responsible for most changes in the exchange rate policies (De Gregorio, 2001).
Ecuador is another Latin American country that has had economic problems due to the 
rapid growth of its external debt. External debt grew from $600 million in 1973 to $16.4 billion 
in 1998, a growth that would pave the way for future macroeconomic instability and the 
inevitable change of exchange rate policies (Jameson, 2003). We can already see that the two 
variables that appear repeatedly are external account balance and foreign debt.
Finally, Peru resembled a number of other small and open Latin American economies 
that were vulnerable to the impact of external factors. Its exchange rate regime changes were 
particularly tied to changes in its terms of trade and fluctuations in international interest rates 
that produced numerous balance of payments crises (Pasco-Font and Ghezzi, 2001).
All of these examples reinforce the necessity of including external and interaction factors 
as important determinants of exchange rate regimes in the Latin American region, along with 
domestic factors.
IV. Exchange Rate Regimes: The Complete Model
As noted above, the data that will be used in the estimation are the same used in
FGS(24). They are panel data for 26 Latin American countries over the period 1960-1994. When 
missing values are taken into account, there are a maximum of 811 observations
Only one of the variables is external and exogenous to country decisions, the volatility of 
terms of trade. We will include a measure of terms of trade in our estimates as another external 
influence on choice of exchange rate regime.
One other set of variables in FGS captures the interaction of domestic policy and the 
international economy: the tariff level, the degree of openness, lagged reserve ratio, and the use 
of capital controls. Their values reflect domestic policy decisions, however they embody the 
international influence on exchange rates in two dimensions. First of all, they will affect the 
viability of any exchange rate regime that is chosen. Second, current international conventional 
wisdom has favored low tariffs, greater openness, high levels of reserves, and removal of capital 
controls to reassure international capital. As a result, these variables reflect an interaction of 
domestic policy choice and international influence. So they should be considered interaction 
variables in our wider evaluation of factors in exchange rate regime choice.
We add four other variables from the original data set of a similar nature: foreign 
liabilities (For Liab), current account restrictions (Curr Res), external account balance (Bal), and 
debt in major foreign currencies(Debt). Each of them is expected to influence policy toward 
fixed exchange rates. In addition, we add the terms of trade (ToT) as another internationally 
given variable.
Let us now examine in more detail the new variables and their expected effect on choice 
of exchange rate regime. The terms of trade variable is defined as the price of exports over the 
price of imports and adheres to the World Bank’s definition. The terms of trade variable is
expected to have a negative coefficient, implying that the improvement in a country’s terms of 
trade should facilitate maintaining or adopting an exchange rate regime designed to provide 
credibility, such as a fixed regime and forward-looking crawls and bands.
Sachs, (1985) associated success of the East Asian economies during the debt crisis of 
the early 1980s with the maintenance of weaker, more competitive, exchange rate regimes that 
depreciated home currencies and encouraged the production of exports. His conclusion followed 
from his argument that foreign capital inflows, ignited by the liberalization of a country’s 
economy and used to facilitate production, would eventually have to result in exchange rate 
depreciation if debt is to be fully repaid. The logic is that depreciation of the domestic currency 
will increase foreign demand for domestic goods and boost the export revenues necessary to 
repay the foreign investment (Sachs, 1981). Sachs’s argument implies that foreign liabilities 
should have a positive coefficient, suggesting that countries with greater foreign liabilities will 
be more likely to adopt a more competitive exchange rate regime, which will increase the 
probability of exchange rate depreciation. Following this argument, debt in major foreign 
currencies is also expected to have a positive coefficient. The current account restriction 
variable, which approaches the value of 1 if restrictions are present, is expected to have a 
negative coefficient. This implies that countries with current account restrictions will be more 
likely to choose a fixed exchange rate regime or forward-looking crawls and bands. These 
regimes, as previously noted, are associated with higher exchange rate appreciations; restrictions 
on the current account are one way to prevent the trade account from deteriorating under these 
circumstances. Under a more competitive exchange rate regime, the exchange rate will be more 
likely to depreciate, thereby decreasing the domestic demand for foreign goods and making
current account restrictions unnecessary.
Finally, the external account balance variable is expected to have a positive coefficient, 
suggesting that countries with increasing positive external balance can be expected to retain a 
competitive exchange rate regime. This variable is lagged one period in order to allow the time 
period needed for governments to react to changes in this account and to make causation clearer.
Appendix II presents the descriptive statistics for the external variables from 1960 to 
1994 as well as values for the same variables for each of the four different regimes specified by 
FGS. The complexity of the relationship can be seen in these data. For example, few of the 
means increase or decrease linearly across regimes. The same is true for the variables used in the 
original study.
V. Results
The choice of the exchange regime is examined using the ordered multinomial logit 
model described in Appendix III. The dependent variable is defined as in the FGS model for the 
purpose of comparison, and the independent variables were described above.
The regressions in Table 1 explore the relationship between the choice of the exchange 
rate regime and only the new external variables. Columns 2-4 assess the sensitivity of the 
regressions to changes in definitions of the dependent variable and differences in time period.
(INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)
Table 1 indicates that all the external/interaction variables except the external account 
balance are statistically significant. Each column of Table 1, with the exception of column two, 
where only observations after the Bretton Woods system collapse are included, represents 
regressions with slightly different definition of the dependent variable. The same sensitivity
analysis is used in Table 1 in order to test the robustness of external variables to changes in the 
definition of the dependent regime variable. The overwhelming majority of Latin American 
exchange rate regimes were fixed prior to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, so column 
two is designed to see if coefficients for the external variables will change when those years are 
excluded. Because of the uncertainty in which group to put them, column three excludes the 
observations where the regime was fixed but with frequent adjustments. Column four reorders 
the response level values for fixed regime and forward-looking crawls and bands, because there 
are conflicting arguments on which of these regimes should be put on the extreme side of 
credibility-competitiveness spectrum. The estimated coefficients should be stable across the 
regressions.
The results indicate that the relationship is robust and that each of the variables is 
statistically significant, with the exception of the external account balance. The time trend is 
excluded from all of the estimates since it likely to be a proxy for international influences. All 
tables report the log likelihoods and pseudo-RA2 measures for corresponding regressions. As 
discussed in more detail in Appendix III, log likelihood is proportional to the badness of fit in 
logit models, while pseudo RA2 is synonymous with the regular linear regression coefficient of 
determination. All regressions were significant at 95% confidence level.
As predicted, the terms of trade variable has a negative coefficient, which suggests that 
the improvement of a country’s terms of trade will increase the probability of its exchange rate 
regime remaining fixed or being a forward-looking crawl or band. The foreign liabilities variable 
is positive, which, again, indicates that an increase in foreign liabilities increases the probability 
that a country will adopt a more competitive exchange rate regime, thereby ensuring enough 
revenues generated by exports to repay its debt to foreign investors. Similarly, debt in major 
foreign currencies is consistently significant and positive. The positive sign indicates that 
countries with large amounts of foreign currency-denominated debt are also more likely to adopt 
a more competitive exchange rate regime. The current account restriction variable has a positive 
coefficient, the opposite of what was expected. This suggests that countries with current account 
restrictions are likely to adopt more competitive exchange rate regimes. A possible explanation 
for this is that countries with current account restrictions are more able to protect against 
instability in their floating exchange rate and are thus more able to maintain flexible exchange 
rates. The external account balance is positive, but it not significant. In a separate set of 
regressions, the external account balance variable was consistently significant when the foreign 
liabilities variable was excluded from the model.
The new external/interaction variables are consistently significant across the variants 
estimated in Table 1. Their coefficients, as expected, do not change measurably with the changed 
specification. It is of interest, however, that the estimates in column 2 differ little from the other 
regressions in the table, suggesting that external variables have had the same impact on choice of 
exchange rate regime both prior to and after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system.
The overall equation provides a better fit of the data than the original FGS model, with a
much lower badness of fit statistic and a slightly improved pseudo-RA2. Table 2 estimates the 
regression in column 1 using all of the external/interaction variables, those in the FGS article as 
well as the new variables we have introduced.
(INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE)
The badness of fit statistic once again improves, though the pseudo RA2 is lower. The 
signs and significance of the variables are comparable to that of Table 1 and to the original FGS 
estimates. Reserve ratio and capital controls variables are not significant in any of the 
regressions. The one change is the decline in the importance of current account restrictions, 
which is no longer statistically significant, in contrast to the FGS estimates.
With the importance of the new external/interaction variables as exchange rate regime 
determinants established, the next step is to determine if they will retain their significance when 
added to the FGS model and whether they improve the fit of that model. Table 3 presents the 
complete model, with the new external/interaction factors added to the FGS regressions. 
(INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE)
Terms of trade, foreign liabilities, debt in major foreign currencies, and current account 
restriction variables are statistically significant.2 All of the coefficients for external/interaction 
variables also retained their approximate values and original signs from the tables where they 
were the only independent variables. This result demonstrates that the variables are robust to 
additions of other non-external variables. In addition, the regression with the variables added to 
the basic FGS model has lower log likelihoods and higher pseudo RA2 measures than the ones 
presented in the FGS article. This indicates that the added external variables reduce the badness 
of fit and improve the explanatory value of the basic FGS model. This reinforces the importance
of including external/interaction variables in models aimed at determining exchange rate policy
3in Latin America.
An important point from the results of the regressions, and related to the objective of this 
paper, is that the model with combined internal and external factors provides the best statistical 
results. By comparing the log likelihood ratios and pseudo RA2 measures in Table 1, the model 
with external variables only with the internally focused FGS model, to the results in Table 3, 
which contains the combination of the previous two, the model with combined internal and 
external/interaction factors produces the lowest log likelihoods and the highest coefficients of 
determination. In other words, the model has higher explanatory value than the other two. So the 
model that best determines the choice of the exchange rate regimes in Latin American economies 
should contain a combination of internal, external and interaction economic variables to allow 
the most complete understanding of this very important choice.
V. Conclusions
This paper explored the importance of the external and interaction economic variables as 
determinants of Latin American exchange rate policy. The paper provided the justification for 
the emphasis of these variables by providing examples of how histories of Latin American 
countries’ exchange rate policies have been determined in good part by international factors. It 
also established the statistical significance of the external factors. Terms of trade, foreign 
liabilities, debt in major foreign currencies, and restrictions of current account variables were all 
significant in determination of the choice of exchange rate regimes in Latin America.
Finally, the paper combined the internal, external and interaction factors into one model
and demonstrated how it produced results better than the ones obtained in models with only 
internal factors or only external factors. The comparison was done by comparing the explanatory 
values of different models, focusing on log likelihoods and pseudo coefficients of determination.
TABLE 1














Open -2.46 -3.39 -2.68 -0.97
(-5.40) (-7.38) (-5.74) (-3.52)
Terms of Trade -0.0177 -0.021 -0.017 -0.0095
(-4.14) (-4.28) (-3.82) (-2.99)
Foreign Liabilities 4.96e-15 4.77e-15 4.86e-15 4.17e-15
(3.92) (3.85) (3.87) (3.64)
Current Acct. 0.58 0.50 0.64 0.68
Restriction (2.52) (2.25) (2.80) (3.17)
External Account 2.00e-13 4.08e-13 1.47e-13 4.36e-13
Balance (0.43) (0.79) (0.30) (1.00)
Debt in major 2.89e-11 2.77e-11 2.90e-11
foreign currencies (4.61) (4.35) (4.66)
N 500 460 480 500
Log Likelihood -389.76 -380.13 -380.38 -423.29
Pseudo RA2 0.204 0.1797 0.209 0.136
TABLE 2
All External/interactive Variables
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APPENDIX I 
COMPARISON OF REGIME CATEGORIZATIONS: FRIEDEN, GHEZZI AND 
STEIN VS. LEVY AND STURZENEGGER
In their comprehensive exchange rate regimes study of 147 countries, Levy and 




4 = Dirty/crawling peg
5 = Fix.
They also simplify the above classification by reducing it to three distinct levels:
1 = Float
2 = Intermediate (dirty; dirty/crawling peg)
3 = Fix.
In order to obtain valid correlation coefficient between this 3-way classification and Stein’s 
classification, we transformed Stein’s four categories in the following manner:
Stein’s original classification
to
Changed Stein’s modified classification
0 = fixed (to single currency, basked, 
or infrequent adjustments)
3 = fixed
1 = forward-looking crawls and bands 2 = intermediate
2 = floating (managed or independent) 1 = float
3 = backward-looking crawl or band 2 = intermediate
Assuming the changes above, we obtained correlation coefficient, A*, of .54 between Stein’s and 
Sturtz’s classifications of exchange rate regimes.
In order to further explore sensitivity analysis of exchange rate regime classification, we 
compared logit regression result with Stein’s basic domestic variables and his definition of the 
dependent variable to the one with same independent variables, but Sturzenneger’s classification 
of the dependent variable. For this, we transformed both Stein’s and Sturtz’s catogorizations into 
a “0 -  2” category system, where 0 represents fixed exchange rate regime and is used as the 
baseline value, against which all others are evaluated. Table below summarizes the 
transformation process:
Stein Original Changed to “0-2” Classification Changed to Sturz’s 3 way 
classification
0 = fixed 0 = fixed 3 = Fix
1 = forward-looking 
crawls and bands
1 = intermediate 2 = Intermediate 
(dirty; dirty/ crawling 
peg)
2 = floating 
(managed or 
independent)
2 = floating 1 = Float
3 = backward- 
looking crawl or 
band
1 = intermediate
Only observations after 1973 were included in regressions, because Sturzenegger’s study covers 
only years 1974 and forward. Logit regression results are shown below:
* A = cov(STEIN,STURTZ)/ <D(STEIN)*<D(STURTZ) = .54
Original Stein’s “0-3” 
classification
Stein’s converted into “0-2” 
classification
Sturtz’s coverted into “0-2” 
classification
.153 .4 -.16
Log Inflation (.697) (1.56) (-.75)
-1.75 -1.54 2.7
Hyper (-2.36) (-1.88) (2.15)
-2.76 -1.68 -2.26
Open (-4.88) (-3.24) (-4.4)
9.14 5.6 2.61
Manugdpl (2.92) (1.73) (.84)
-1.19 -1.25 .17
Polins (-2.04) (-2.14) (.34)
-3.88 -3.9 -4.35
Govseats (-4.05) (-3.8) (-4.4)
-0.27 .019 -.084
Efpart (-2.09) (.142) (-.612)
N 363 363 349
Log Likelihood -323.35 -282.68 -282.51
Pseudo RA2 0.1552 0.1645 0.1761
Three independent variables: log inflation, hyperinflation, and political instability, all changed
signs when Sturtz’s “0-2” categorization was used rather than either Stein classification system. 
Again there is less than perfect correlation between Stein’s and Sturtz’s classifications of 
exchange rate regimes. This indicates the importance of the definition of exchange rate regime.
APPENDIX II 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ADDED EXTERNAL AND INTERACTION 
VARIABLES 
Descriptive Statistics for all Interaction/External Variables
Variable # of obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Volatility 786 .0821596 .0864097 .0049319 .4753268
Tariff 645 .1844961 .3881893 0 1
Openness 836 .6372083 .4051915 .082722 2.498747
Reserves/M2 834 .2395633 .204609 .0004212 1.552833
Capital Controls 721 .7170596 .4507404 0 1
Terms of Trade 811 123.3909 40.81798 30 359
Foreign Liability 747 3.39e+13 1.81e+14 3.27e-06 1.72e+15
Curr Acct Restr 724 .538674 .4988467 0 1
Bal 1l 811 -2.31e+10 2.28e+11 -1.27e+12 1.56e+12
External Balance 836 -2.58e+10 2.47e+11 -2.24e+12 1.56e+12
Debt 585 7.81e+09 1.74e+10 4075200 9.87e+10





Volatil .0902165 .08238 .07564 .04238
Tariff .0604651 .5172 .5862 .2727
Openness .699576 .4762 .5503 .38
Res/M2 .2262 .2164 .2658 .3084
Cap Con .6935 .6207 .6309 .9394
ToT 127 112.8 110.90 113.73
For Liab 2.76e+12 4.54e+14 3.70e+13 2.04e+14
Curr Res .5058 .3448 .3809 .8989
Bal 1l -3.44e+10 -2.90e+10 -5.61e+09 2.98e+10
Ext Bal -3.37e+10 6.42e+09 -2.25e+10 1.05e+10
Debt 2.86e+09 1.63e+10 1.15e+10 2.18e+10
Appendix III 
Logit Model
Logit models are used when the dependent variable has a discrete number of response 
levels. The parameters are estimated using the method of Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
(MLE), which is concerned with picking parameter estimates that result in the highest 
probability of having obtained the observed sample Y (Aldrich & Nelson, 1984). Logit 
parameter estimates for independent variables represent the impacts of the changes in the 
variables on the probability of a certain dependent variable response level occurring over the 
reference response level. An equation for a simple binomial logit model, where the dependent 
variable has only two response levels, 0 and 1, has the form:
ln[Pi/(l-Pi)]= a  + piXii + p2X2i + Oi, 
where the left-hand variable represents the natural log of the probability that the state 
described by Pi will occur over the state described by 1-Pi. We can see that the increases in the 
values of the parameters (3i and (32 increase the value of ln[Pi/(l-Pi)], which implies the higher 
probability described by Pi. If we wanted to derive the explicit formula for Pi, it would take the 
form:
Pi = l/[ l+ eA-(a + piXii + p2X2i + Oi)], 
which shows us that the equation limits the dependent variable output to the values 
between 0 and 1, regardless of how large or small the values of the independent variables are 
since:
the limit as l+eA-(a + PiXii + p2X2i + 0i)64 of Pi = 1,
and the limit as l+eA-(a + (3iXii +  $2X 21 +  0i)6-4 of Pi =  0 (Studenmund, 2001). 
Similarly, the same method is used in the case when the dependent variable has more 
than two discrete response levels. If there are N number of dependant variable response levels, a 
series of N-1 binomial logit equations are created. This type of model is named multinomial 
logit. One response level is used as a baseline value that remains in the denominator of the left 
side of the equation. All obtained equations can be combined into one under the assumptions that 
the impacts of parameter estimates are independent of the dependent variable response level 
values, and that they are invariant to the choice of the cutoff point ai.
More specific type of multinomial logit model, multinomial ordered logit, is used when 
the response levels for the dependent variable are ordered. There are several ways to build this 
model. In this section, I will only introduce the cumulative logits method. For alternative 
methods, see Agresti (1990). Cumulative logits method estimates the probability that a case will 
fall in the category j or lower, as opposed to category j + 1 or higher (DeMaris, 1992). If 0#j is 
the j-th cumulative odds, and n j is the probability of obtaining a response level in category j, 
than the model will take have the form:
ln[(7n+7T2+ . . . +7i j)/(7i j+i + . . . +7u)] = ln(0#j) = a  + PiXii + fteX2i + Oi (DeMaris, 1992) 
We can see that the logits keep accumulating until the j -1 logit. The j logit will always 
remain in the denominator of the left-hand side variable as an extreme dependent variable 
response level. Throughout the regressions in this paper, the extreme dependent variable 
response level of 0, representing the fixed exchange rate regime, is used as a baseline value.
Two measures used to demonstrate any changes in the statistical values of the logit 
models are GA2 and pseudo RA2 . GA2 is the deviance of the model and has a form:
Ga2 = -2lnL,
where lnL is the model=s log likelihood. It follows from this that the log likelihood is 
directly related to the deviance of the model. As the model=s explanatory value increases, log 
likelihood decreases thereby lowering the Ga2 measure. Ga2 is often used as analogous to the 
residual sum of squares (DeMaris, 1992). If  we know the deviance of the model we can use it to 
approximate the coefficient of determination, or Ra2. It is given by:
Ra2=[(G<>a2 - G1A2)/G<>A2] = 1- (G1A2/G0A2), 
where G1A2 represents th deviance of a model with variables, and G0A2 is the deviance of 
the null model, with only the intercept terms. This pseudo-RA2 can be thought of as the 
proportion of deviance explained (DeMaris, 1992).
Lastly, maximum likelihood analysis is unique in that it follows asymptotic normal 
probability distribution. The probability distribution is fully formed only if  the number of 
observations is high enough to allow for this property. There is no specific rule of thumb how 
high the number of observations should be. However, as mentioned in earlier in the paper, it is 
recommended that one has at least 15 observations per independent variable for a reliable 
analysis.
1 The variables, their measurement, and their expected effect on the choice of exchange rate regime is specified in 
detail in Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein 2000). The interested reader is referred to that source for more extensive 
treatment of the variables.
2 There might be some question about the statistical significance of the results obtained in Table 3 because of the low 
number of observations relative to the results in the FGS model. Since there are no firm guidelines regarding the 
number of observations in logit modeling, the same rule of thumb that is used in ordinary least squares analysis can 
be used for multinomial logit (Demaris 1992). The rule states that there should be at least 15 observations per 
explanatory variable in order for the results to be reliable. The regression in Table 3 follows this guideline.
3 In a separate set of regressions, not shown in this paper, external account balance along with the current account 
restriction variables were consistently significant when other external variables were not included in the regressions. 
Given the choices between the model with these two variables or the model already present in this paper, we report 
the results in the latter model because it better captures the external macroeconomic influences. Also, when time 
trend is included in regressions, debt in major foreign currencies variable loses its statistical significance, with log 
likelihoods and pseudo RA2 measures remaining approximately the same throughout the regressions.
